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Abstract
Part I discusses the antidumping law in the context of subsidy inclusion in constructed value
calculations. Part II outlines the CIT’s exclusion of subsidies from the cost component of con-
structed value in light of the court’s policy rationales, and its interpretation of legislative, judicial,
and administrative authority. Part III suggests that when a subsidy that benefits production is not
countervailable, such as a subsidy that is generally available, the policy of remedying the unfair
advantage created by the subsidy outweighs the CIT’s policy concern’s in Al Tech Specialty.
ANTIDUMPING, CONSTRUCTED VALUE, AND NON-
COUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDIES: A PROPOSED
INCLUSION OF SUBSIDIES IN
CONSTRUCTED VALUE AFTER
AL TECH SPECIALTY STEEL CORP. v. UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
The antidumping' and countervailing duty2 laws are reme-
dies available to domestic industries3 injured by foreign produ-
cers who benefit from unfair trade practices, such as dumping4
or subsidization. 5 The purpose of the United States antidump-
ing law is to provide a remedy against unfair pricing practices6
by foreign importers.7 When foreign goods are sold in the
United States at less than their fair value,8 the antidumping law
imposes a duty, in addition to customs duties, equal to the dif-
ference between the foreign market value9 and the U.S. price'0
of the imported goods." If there is no adequate foreign mar-
ket value or if the foreign producer dumps in its home market,
1. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673-1677h (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
2. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1671h (West 1980 &,Supp. 1987).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (A)-(F) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). Standing is not limited
to domestic producers. Id.
4. See Kaplan, Kamarck & Parker, Cost of Production and Constructed Value Analysis: A
Legal and Policy View, in U.S. TRADE LAW AND POLICY 31, 33 (1987).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. See Epstein, The Illusory Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust, 18 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1, 5 (1973). An exporter engaging in predatory pricing sets his export price at
whatever level is necessary to eliminate competition. Id.
7. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 5 (1973). When one or more firms achieves a
price advantage through discrimination rather than through efficiency, the expected
mechanisms of competitive markets may be distorted. Id. Dumping, a form of inter-
national price discrimination, can impair competition if it results in less efficient firms
driving more efficient firms out of the market. Id. at 7. The result of such an event
would be resource misallocation. See also Anthony, The American Response to Dumping
From Capitalist and Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises, and Restructered Procedures Af-
ter the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 163-77 (1969).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Fair value is intended to be an
estimate of foreign market value. 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1987).
9. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b (West Supp. 1987); see also 19 C.F.R. § 353.3 (1987).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1982).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). If the ITA finds that the sales are
being made or are likely to be made at less than fair value and the International
Trade Commission finds that a U.S. industry is materially injured, threated with such
injury, or that the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded, then an antidumping duty is imposed "equal to the amount by which the
foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price for the merchandise." Id.
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then constructed value' 2 may be used as a surrogate for for-
eign market value. 3 The United States Court of International
Trade ("CIT") recently decided in Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v.
United States "4 that subsidies could not be added to constructed
value in a case where the subsidy at issue could be remedied
under the countervailing duty law.'
This Comment concurs with the Al Tech Specialty decision,
but argues that its holding should not apply where the subsi-
dies in question benefit production and are not countervail-
able. Part I discusses the antidumping law in the context of
subsidy inclusion in constructed value calculations. Part II
outlines the CIT's exclusion of subsidies from the cost compo-
nent of constructed value in light of the court's policy ratio-
nales, and its interpretation of legislative, judicial, and admin-
istrative authority. Part III suggests that when a subsidy that
benefits production is not countervailable, such as a subsidy
that is generally available, the policy of remedying the unfair
advantage created by the subsidy outweighs the CIT's policy
concern's in Al Tech Specialty.
I. CONSTRUCTED VALUE IN ANTIDUMPING LAW
Protection against unfair trade practices is based on the
need to protect vulnerable domestic industries,' 6 because such
practices may result in market disruption and the reduction of
competition.' 7 The countervailing duty law counteracts the ef-
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13. Kaplan, Kamarck & Parker, supra note 4, at 33.
14. 651 F. Supp. 1421 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
15. Id. at 1429-30. According to the Al Tech Specialty court, "The antidumping
remedy protects domestic industry from imported merchandise sold at less than fair
value, which imports either have caused or threaten to cause material injury....
Countervailing duty law, in contrast, was enacted specifically to address the market
distortions caused by subsidization." Id.
16. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States Coun-
tervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958). Dumping has existed
as long as the mercantile system, but it has been of major international significance
since the late nineteenth century. Id. at 51. The cartels of Europe and the United
States often dumped products in less-developed markets. Id. However, dumping
legislation arose in many nations as an attempt to protect "war baby" industries fol-
lowing World War I. Id.
17. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2-7. Epstein divides price discrimination be-
tween national markets into four categories: Introducing New Products, Meeting
Competition, Maximizing Current Revenue, and Predatory Pricing. The most delete-
rious type of dumping from an economic standpoint is intermittent dumping. Id.
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fect of foreign government subsidies on products exported to
the United States. 8 It generally provides for a duty on im-
ports equal to the foreign government subsidy received by the
foreign producer. '9
The antidumping law complements the countervailing
duty remedy by counteracting the unfair pricing behavior of
foreign producers. 2' The antidumping law, as embodied in Ti-
tle VII of the Tariff Act of 1930,2' may be defined as a surtax,
in addition to normal duties, imposed on imports whose price
is less than the "fair value ' 22 for such goods. Fair value is not
specifically defined but it is generally considered synonymous
with foreign market value. 23 The additional antidumping duty
is intended to restore the price of goods to their fair value, and
thus prevent injury to U.S. producers of similar merchandise.24
Under U.S. antidumping law, dumping margins are mea-
sured by calculating the amount that foreign market value
("FMV") exceeds the United States price ("USP") of the im-
ported merchandise.2 5 The International Trade Administra-
Other commentators have argued in the antitrust context that price predation either
does not exist or is too rare to justify an antidumping law. See R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 155 (1978). But see Epstein, Foreign
Predation Against U.S. Firms: Reconciling International and Domestic Policies, in 1984 FORD-
HAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 41 (B. Hawk ed. 1985).
18. Ehrenhaft, supra note 16, at 54. See generally G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICES: A STUDY OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY LAWS 249-54 (1980); J. PATrISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUrY
LAWS § 1.04 (1987).
19. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1671h (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). These sections pro-
vide the countervailing duty law which applies to goods imported from countries
under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Id. Section 303 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982), applies to exports from a country not
under the Agreement. Although the International Trade Administration ("ITA") ap-
plies the same substantive and procedural law to section 303 and Title VII cases,
there is no injury requirement for imports from non-agreement countries. See E.
RossIDES, UNITED STATES IMPORT TRADE REGULATION 241-48 (1986).
20. Ehrenhaft, supra note 16, at 58.
21. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("TAA"), Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93
Stat. 144, 150, added to the Tariff Act of 1930 a new Title VII,.Countervailing and
Antidumping Duties, which replaced and repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch.
14, §§ 201-212, 42 Stat. 9, 11-15. See E. RoSSIDES, supra note 19, at 195.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982).
23. 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1987).
24. Ehrenhaft, supra note 16, at 58.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1673. Foreign market value, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b (West Supp.
1987), is the wholesale price for sales in the home market f.o.b. (free on board) the
factory. However, this source of foreign market value is often inadequate. If there
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tion ("ITA")2 6 of the Commerce Department calculates the
FMV by resort to home market prices.2 7 If home market sales
are below market value for an extended period, or if the prod-
uct is made solely for export, then the ITA may use con-
structed value to represent the FMV for the purpose of calcu-
lating an accurate dumping duty.28
Constructed value consists of four factors: 1) general pro-
duction costs; 2) costs incidental to placing the merchandise in
condition for exportation to the United States; 3) general ex-
penses reflected by sales of comparable merchandise in the
home market; and 4) profits reflected by sales of comparable
merchandise in the home market.29  The constructed value
formula in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) ambiguously defines general
production costs as costs "which would ordinarily permit the
are no home market sales, or if home sales are so small in relation to the quantity
sold for exportation to countries other than the United States (third countries), then
the foreign market value is determined on the basis of the price at which the mer-
chandise is sold or offered for sale to such third countries. Alternatively, the ITA will
construct a foreign market value if there are no adequate third-country prices or if
the ITA has reason to believe that the foreign sales are made at less than the cost of
production. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b (West Supp. 1987). See generally E. RosSIDES, supra
note 19, at 198-99.
United States price, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1982), means the purchase price, or the
exporter's sales price, whichever is the first arm's length transaction; that is, the first
sale to a non-related entity. See E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, at
360-62 (1986); E. RossIDES, supra note 19, at 199.
26. See H. KAYE, P. PLATA & M. HERTZBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE
§ 18.02 (1981). The ITA has been the administering authority that conducts coun-
tervailing duty and antidumping investigations since Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (Dec. 3, 1979). Id. The Treasury Department preceded
Commerce as the administering authority. See generally E. McGOVERN, supra note 25,
§ 12.14.
27. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (West Supp. 1987); 19 C.F.R. § 353.1.
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b, 1677e (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also S. REP. No.
1298, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 173 (1974). In explanation of the addition of the cost of
production section, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982), the Report stated, "The Commit-
tee is concerned that, in the absence of such a provision, sales uniformly made at less
than cost of production could escape the purview of the Act, and thereby cause injury
to United States industry with impunity." S. REP. No. 1298, supra, at 173. Id.
According to Department of Commerce estimates, about fifty percent of current
antidumping cases involve cost of production or constructed value analyses. Kaplan,
Kamarck & Parker, supra note 4, at 33. The increasing importance of constructed
value analysis stems, in part, from growing world-wide over-capacity in several sec-
tors, including the steel and semiconductor industries. Id. at 146. It is also a result
of growth in the number of export-oriented industries targeted towards the United
States market. Id.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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production of that particular merchandise in the ordinary
course of business." 30 The statute does not specify which costs
may be considered. In the case of a government subsidy that
benefits production, the cost could be that expended solely by
the manufacturer, 3 1 or the manufacturer's costs plus govern-
ment subsidies, which are, in effect, contributions to the cost of
production. 2
The primary statutory issue before the CIT in Al Tech Spe-
cialty Steel Corp. v. United States33 was whether the cost of pro-
duction3 4 and constructed value"5 sections of the antidumping
law require the ITA to include subsidies that. benefit produc-
tion as a component of cost in its constructed value of West
German tool steel.36 The ITA excluded these subsidies from
constructed value, and the CIT affirmed."
II. THE AL TECH SPECIALTY DECISION
In Al Tech Specialty, the West German federal and state
governments heavily subsidized Arbed Saarstahl GmbH, a
West German producer of tool steel imported into the United
States."8 The domestic plaintiff contended that these subsidies
30. Id. The constructed value section does not clearly specify whether the pro-
duction costs it lists should be the actual cost of production, including subsidies
which benefit production, or the cost expended solely by the manufacturer. In Al
Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986),
the CIT recently chose the latter construction in a case involving countervailable sub-
sidies. See 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
31. See 50 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985).
32. Id. The Al Tech Specialty plaintiffs argued before the ITA that all manufactur-
ing costs should be considered, regardless of who bears the cost, since the subsidies
merely shift costs from the producer to the government. 50 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1985). The statute makes no reference to the production or material
costs incurred by an individual producer. Id.
33. 651 F. Supp. 1421.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
36. 651 F. Supp. at 1423.
37. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,071, 10,072 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1986); see also Al Tech Spe-
cialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
38. See Memorandum in Support of Plantiff's Renewed Motion for Judgment
upon an Agency Record at 3-5, Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 651 F.
Supp. 1421 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (84-08-01192); see also Saarstahl Will Need More Aid,
Metal Bulletin, July 1, 1983, at 21; More Aid For Saarstahl, Metal Bulletin, Sept. 13,
1983 (since 1978, Saarstahl has received DM 3.065 billion in state guarantees, bo-
nuses and debt absorption. Saarstahl requested an additional grant of DM 86 million
for 1983, and as of September 1983 had received DM 30 million of this grant).
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should be considered as a component of the manufacturer's
cost.3 9 However, the ITA rejected this argument and based its
cost calculation on only those expenses actually recorded in
the foreign producer's books and records.4 °
The Al Tech Specialty court determined that traditional
sources of statutory construction-legislative history, judicial
precedent, and administrative practice-failed to demonstrate
that the ITA's interpretation of cost of production and con-
structed value was unreasonable. 4' Consequently, the CIT de-
ferred to the ITA's interpretation of cost, adopting both its ex-
clusion of subsidies and its sole reliance on costs as docu-
mented in the producer's books and records.42
39. 50 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985) Standing to file an an-
tidumping petition is broad. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A)-(F) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
For instance, an antidumping proceeding can be commenced by an interested party
who files a petition with the Commerce Department "on behalf of an industry" in
proper form. Rosenthal, Current Issues in Antidumping Law, in U.S. TRADE LAW AND
POLICY 9, 11-14 (1987). See generally H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M. HERTZBERG, supra note
26, §§ 18.23-.28 (1986) ("interested parties" includes foreign producers, foreign ex-
porters, U.S. importers, foreign governments, U.S. producers, U.S. wholesalers, la-
bor unions, and U.S. trade associations).
40. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,071, 10,072 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1986).
41. 651 F. Supp. at 1429. After considering these sources of construction, the
court concluded that "[tihe sources discussed thus far, even if viewed in toto, are not
clearly dispositive of the issues involved in this case." Id.
42. See supra note 37. Prior to the enactment of the TAA and the Customs Court
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1771 (1980), commentators considered the
statutory scheme for judicial review inadequate. See generally Vance,Judicial Review of
Antidumping Orders in the United States and the European Economic Community, 26 N.Y.L.S.
L. REV. 577 (1981) (recent improvements in judicial review of U.S. administrative
determinations compared with those of the E.E.C.). The TAA and the Customs
Court Act of 1980 effected a sweeping overhaul of U.S. unfair import law. See Note,
Judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Towards a Uni-
fied System of Review, 14J. INT'L L. & ECON. 101 (1979).
The scope ofjudicial review of final antidumping administrative determinations
is defined to be whether the determination is "unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(3)(b)(l)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The United States Supreme Court has determined that as
long as an agency does not act in express violation of statutory intent, courts should
give substantial weight to the agency's interpretation of the statute it administers.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1978). The Court ex-
plained that administrative practice has special weight when it involves the "construc-
tion of a statute by the [persons] charged with the responsibility of setting its machin-
ery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet
untried and new." Id. at 450 (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has qualified the
rule of deference to agency determinations, warning: "Expert discretion is the life-
blood of the administrative process, but 'unless we make the requirements for admin-
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The court's primary rationale for its decision was that the
subsidies in question could be more properly counteracted by
the countervailing duty law.43 The court also reasoned that
consideration of subsidies exceeded the scope and purpose of
the antidumping law." The court further reasoned that if the
subsidies were included in constructed value, the ITA would
be required to consider subsidies without undertaking a coun-
tervailing duty investigation. 45 Thus, the court suggested that
defendants might be deprived of due process safeguards
unique to the countervailing duty law, particularly those con-
cerning whether a countervailable subsidy exists.46 Finally, the
CIT held that subsidy inclusion would create substantial uncer-
tainty among exporters because benefits which were not previ-
ously countervailable could be attacked.47
A. Authority for Subsidy Consideration in Constructed Value
Neither the cost of production section 48 nor the con-
structed value section 49 of the antidumping law expressly ad-
dresses whether domestic subsidies may be considered in con-
structed value calculations. Furthermore, legislative history,
judicial precedent, and administrative practice establish little
controlling authority for the CIT's exclusion of subsidies from
constructed value calculations.50 These sources of statutory
interpretation provide even less authority for the refusal to
consider non-countervailable subsidies that benefit or supple-
ment production costs in the constructed value calculation.
istrative action strict and demanding, expertise .... can become a monster which rules
with no practical limits on its discretion.'" Burlington Truck Lines v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962); see Kennedy,Judicial Review of Commerce Department Antidump-
ing Duty Determinations: Deference or Abdication?, 11 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 19, 33
(1986).
43. 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
44. Id. at 1429.
45. Id. at 1430.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
50. 651 F. Supp. at 1425-29.
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1. Legislative History and Subsidy Inclusion in
Constructed Value
The Trade Act of 1974"' broadened the use of con-
structed value by adding the cost of production section, under
which the ITA must use constructed value instead of home
market price in cases of home market dumping.5 2 "Home mar-
ket dumping" is defined as sales in the home market that fall
below the cost of production and that do not allow the manu-
facturer to cover costs within a reasonable time in the normal
course of trade.53 The House Report accompanying the 1974
Act comments on the determination of home market dumping,
but is inconclusive on the propriety of subsidy inclusion in the
cost of production section. 54 It specifies that the generally ac-
cepted accounting principles of the country of origin will be
used to determine whether home market dumping exists, as
long as such principles reasonably reflect the variable and fixed
51. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974). The Trade Act of 1974 amended
section 205 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 205, 42 Stat. 9, 13, to provide
for the use of constructed value in cases of home market dumping. This provision
remains law. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982). See generally Campbell, The Foreign Trade
Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (pt. 2), 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 658-63 (1976).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1973). This House Report
accompanied the Trade Act of 1974, which added the cost of production section-) 9
U.S.C. § 1677b(b)-and explained that the accounting principles generally accepted
in the country of export should be used in determining whether merchandise has
been sold at less than cost "if [the ITA] is satisfied that such principles reasonably
reflect the variable and fixed costs of producing the merchandise." Id. It is ambigu-
ous whether these variable and fixed costs include all costs incurred in the produc-
tion of the merchandise (costs assumed by manufacturer and subsidizer), or only the
costs incurred by the manufacturer. Since a cost of production section finding of
home market sales less than value is often followed by a constructed value determina-
tion, the cost components of both have similar purposes: to accurately approximate
the value of imported goods for the eventual purpose of imposing a dumping duty
that reflects the extent of discriminatory pricing. Therefore, the suggested limitation
of Al Tech Specialty is consistent with the fair price comparison required under the
antidumping law. The antidumping law should be applied so that the comparison
between foreign market value and United States price is an "apples to apples" com-
parison that accurately measures the dumping margin. See Smith-Corona v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b).
54. See H. REP. No. 571, supra note 52, at 71. Due to the similarity of the cost
components in the cost of production and constructed value sections, authority to
include certain subsidies within the cost of production in order to accurately "reflect
the variable and fixed costs of producing the merchandise" would suggest inclusion
in constructed value.
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costs of producing the merchandise.5 5 Even though the gener-
ally accepted accounting principles of the country of export
may not expressly require subsidy consideration in cost of pro-
duction, the consideration of such subsidies may be necessary
to reasonably reflect the producer's variable and fixed costs. 56
Indeed, the primary purpose of the cost of production section
was to ensure a more accurate dumping margin. The issue
remains, however, whether the ITA may consider a subsidy
that benefits production in calculating cost of production or
constructed value to more accurately reflect the variable and
fixed costs of production.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 198458 did not incorporate an
input dumping proviso 59 that, in effect, would have permitted
the ITA to construct the value of the materials or components
used in producing a dumped product if those materials were
dumped in the exporter's home market. 60 Access to a dumped
production component would constitute a benefit to produc-
tion as much as any government subsidy. By counteracting
such a government-provided dumped-production input under
this proviso, the ITA would have been capable of counteract-
ing a production-benefitting subsidy with the anitidumping
law.6'
2. Judicial Precedent and Subsidy Inclusion in
Constructed Value
Prior to Al Tech Specialty, no conclusive judicial precedent
oxisted interpreting whether subsidies may be considered, to
the extent they benefit production, in calculating the cost com-
ponent of constructed value.62 Furthermore, no court has re-




58. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.); see Bello, Current Subsidy and Antidumping Issues After the Trade and TatiffAct of
1984, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 299 (1985).
59. See Bello, supra note 58, at 319-20. The Trade and Tariff Act did add an
upstream subsidies section, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677-1 (West Supp. 1987), which allows
the ITA to counteract countervailable subsidies made on production components.
60. Bello, supra note 58, at 319-20.
61. Id.
62. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1426-28.
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dies that benefit production.63 The first judicial consideration
of whether foreign government subsidies may be included
within constructed value,J. H. Cottman v. United States,' favored
subsidy inclusion. The Cottman holding probably is distin-
guishable from the current subsidy issue. If Cottman were de-
cided today, the market distortion created by government sub-
sidization would be addressed by the antidumping law's state-
controlled economy section, which was enacted in 1974.65
Under this section of the antidumping law, the ITA employs
the home market price or constructed value of such or similar
merchandise from a comparable market economy country. 66 If
Cottman were decided under this section, the foreign market
value would not be distorted by the foreign government's sub-
sidy as long as the ITA could find a comparable market econ-
omy surrogate that produced similar unsubsidized merchan-
dise. Thus, a court would not be compelled to factor this gov-
ernment input subsidy in constructed value.
The persuasiveness of Cottman is also limited by European
Trading Co. v. United States, 67 which was decided eight years
later. In European Trading, the Court of Customs and Patents
63. Id. Thus, the inclusion of countervailable subsidies in constructed value was
a novel issue for the CIT. None of the cases involving subsidies not countervailable
under the generally available rule, see infra notes 102-108, have considered this issue.
See, e.g. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal
dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Agrexco Agricultural Export Co. v. United
States, 604 F. Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United
States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 339, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (1984); Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v.
United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 229, 564 F. Supp. 834 (1983).
64. J.H. Cottman & Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 344, cert. denied 289 U.S.
750 (1932). In Coltman the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") found
that the government had a monopoly on the production and sale of phosphate in
Morocco, and that no usable home market or third country sales existed. Id. at 352.
In a constructed value calculation, the court held that even though production costs
were covered by the government, they could not be discounted to zero. Id. at 358-
59. By holding that production costs must be greater than zero, the court in effect
held that production benefitting subsidies had to be given some value and included
in the constructed value calculation. Id. at 358-60.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
66. 651 F. Supp. at 1427. The Al Tech Specialty court suggested that the state-
controlled economy section would probably apply if Coltman were decided today. See
id.
67. United States v. European Trading Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 289 (1940). In European
Trading, a German producer of wire fish netting received an export rebate from its
wire rod supplier, which the Customs appraiser categorized as a subsidy, adding it to
"cost of production." Id. at 296.
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Appeals ("CCPA") held that an export subsidy should not be
added to constructed value. 8 Instead, the CCPA unanimously
held that the customs appraiser should use the producer's ac-
tual cost in constructed value. 9 The European Trading court re-
jected the use of subsidies in antidumping actions and warned
against the unnecessary commingling of antidumping and
countervailing duty law.70 Nevertheless, European Trading is
distinguishable from the limited inclusion of non-countervail-
able subsidies because the export subsidy in that case was
countervailable, and, therefore, could be fully counteracted. 7 1
Customs valuation 72 cases have held that subsidies may be
included in constructed value, 73 but such decisions are persua-
sive only to the extent that the valuation policies in customs
law for subsidy inclusion are consistent with the policies of the
antidumping law.74 The 1958 antidumping amendments aban-
doned the term "cost of production ' 75 and adopted the term
68. Id. at 296.
69. Id. at 296-97.
70. lId The European Trading court rejected consideration of countervailable ex-
port subsidies in antidumping actions and the cross-fertilization of antidumping and
countervailing duty concepts. Id. at 297. As in Al Tech Specialty, the European Trading
court contemplated the countervailing duty law as a more appropriate remedy. Id.
71. 27 C.C.P.A. at 297. The European Trading court explained:
[T]he antidumping act contains no express provision covering rebates, gra-
tuities or grants, such as was provided in the countervailing duty provision
to the Tariff Act of 1930. Incidentally, it may be said also that at the time of
the passage of the antidumping act in 1921, the 1913 Tariff Act, which con-
tained a countervailing duty provision . . .was in force and continued in
force for sometime thereafter.
Id.
72. See generally R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION § 43.2 (1986).
73. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 553 (1952). The court held
that pattern equipment made by a U.S. importer is properly added into the cost of
production of rough iron castings manufactured in and exported from Canada. Id. at
557. It also said that the purpose of the cost of production statute in customs valua-
tion law is "to derive, not the manufacturer's actual cost, but the actual cost of manu-
facture." Id. at 557; see also Ravenna Mosaics Inc. v. United States, 49 Treas. Dec. 699
(1926). In Ravenna Mosaics, the court held that the cost of preparing design sketches,
which was paid by the U.S. importer, was properly added as a production cost of
mosaics exported to the United States. 49 Treas. Dec. 699.
74. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1427-28; see also Television Receiving Sets,
Monochrome and Color, From Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of An-
tidumping Finding, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,163 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1981) (stating that judi-
cial decisions interpreting the phrase "freely offered" in the context of customs laws
are irrelevant to interpreting the antidumping law).
75. S. Rep. No. 1619, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3499, 3505.
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"constructed value,"' 76 which was the term derived from the
Customs Simplification Act of 19567' and used in customs val-
uation. 78 Notwithstanding the use of identical terms, customs
valuation cases are at most suggestive of the possibility of con-
sidering subsidies within a constructed value context.79
3. Administrative Practice and Subsidy Inclusion in
Constructed Value
In the past the ITA has deducted government subsidies
from reported costs in calculating constructed value.8" How-
ever, it no longer subtracts subsidies8" and recently has re-
fused to add such subsidies to reported costs. 82 The ITA cur-
rently relies on the producer's costs as reflected in properly
maintained books and records.8" Thus, there is no long-stand-
76. Id.
77. The Customs Simplification Act of 1956, ch. 887, 70 Stat. 943, 944 (1956),
applied to all merchandise except a few specific items left on a "final list" for valua-
tion under the retained 1930 Act. E. RoSSIDES, supra note 19, at 132-38. Under the
1956 Act constructed value was used if export value and United States value could
not be found. Similar to the constructed value of the antidumping law, the con-
structed value of the 1956 Act was the sum of the following costs: materials,
fabrication and processing, plus the cost of containers, coverings, and packing for
shipment. E. RosSIDES, supra note 19, at 110-34.
78. E. RossIDES, supra note 19, at 110-34.
79. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1427-28.
80. See Preliminary Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Cer-
tain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 35,664 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1982) [hereinafter Steel Products From the Netherlands] (production costs absorbed
by government grants that were subtracted to calculate cost of production to avoid
possible double counting of subsidies in concurrent antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations).
81. Compare Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (Commerce relied on the costs reflected in the manufacturer's
financial statement) with Steel Products From the Netherlands, supra note 80 and Red
Raspberries from Canada; Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 50
Fed. Reg. 19,768 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985) (wage rebate benefits subtracted as off-
sets to costs since such benefits were attributable directly to raspberry production).
See generally Washington Red Raspberries Commission v. United States, 657 F. Supp.
537, 541-42 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (CIT affirms ITA's subtraction of wage rebate
benefits from costs, citing Al Tech Specialty as authority for not adding wage benefits to
the cost component of constructed value).
82. See Steel Products from the Netherlands, supra note 80; see also Certain Steel
I-Beams from Belgium, Antidumping Determination of Sales at not Less than Fair
Value, 44 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1979).
83. The current Commerce policy is articulated in Import Administration Policy
Paper # 13 as follows:
Where a producer receives an outright grant or other bounty from its gov-
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ing administrative practice on which litigants would have re-
lied. Because no long-standing administrative practice exists
to support either adding subsidies or reliance on costs as docu-
mented in the producer's books and records, prior administra-
tive practice in antidumping actions provides no controlling
authority for either approach.84
B. Policy Rationales for the Refusal to Consider Subsidies that Benefit
Production when Constructing Foreign Market Value
In Al Tech Specialty, the CIT emphasized that the subsidies
in question were countervailable.8 5 Subsidy inclusion was un-
necessary because the subsidy could be counteracted through
the countervailing duty law. Indeed, the countervailing duty
law is the proper remedy for such subsidies.8 6 However, the
court's other reasons for excluding subsidies that benefit pro-
duction from constructed value are less persuasive, particularly
in the context of non-countervailable subsidies that benefit
production.
1. The Concern About Commingling Countervailing and
Antidumping Laws
In Al Tech Specialty, the CIT stated that the ITA should rely
on the costs as documented in the producer's books and
records, and that it would be improper to include subsidies in
the cost component of constructed value.87 The CIT added
ernment, the amount of the benefit is not included as a cost of production to
the producer. Only the actual costs of the producer as reflected in its finan-
cial statements and traced down to its accounts is included in its cost of
production, that is, there is no imputation of costs.
Id. See H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 52, at 71 (1973).
84. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1429. The Al Tech Specialty court concluded
that "past administrative practice in antidumping cases supports neither side." Id.
85. 651 F. Supp. at 1430. The Al Tech Specialty court wrote "[E]ven if the impact
of Saarstahl's subsidies was substantial and it avoided penalties solely through the
election of favorable accounting procedures, plaintiffs' claim is still more properly
addressed by countervailing duty law." Id.
86. Id.; see also Huffy Corp. v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 50, 55-56 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986). This case was cited inAl Tech Specialty for the proposition that the court
should avoid consideration of subsidies in an antidumping determination since the
determination of whether a countervailable subsidy exists is a complex one and Con-
gress has provided a separate set of guidelines for this determination. See Al Tech
Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
87. 651 F. Supp. at 1430. TheAl Tech Specialty court wrote: "Utilizing producers'
records of cost of production, kept in accordance with generally accepted local ac-
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that the calculation of subsidies is not within the scope of the
antidumping law, and further distinguished the purpose of the
antidumping law from that of the countervailing duty law. 88
The court explained that the antidumping law counteracts the
comparative advantage of foreign manufacturers who employ
inconsistent pricing policies in the international market.89 In
contrast, it reasoned that countervailing duty law protects do-
mestic industries from the market distortions caused by for-
eign subsidization.9" Thus, both laws protect domestic com-
petitors from unfairly low import prices. The court, however,
contended that the amount of foreign subsidies received does
not directly correlate to a firm's disparate pricing practices. 9'
Prices can be raised or lowered independent of the effects of
subsidization. The focus of each law generally differs, and,
therefore, the countervailing duty and antidumping remedies
should not be commingled if the subsidy can be counter-
vailed.92
counting procedures, which procedures reasonably reflect fixed and variable costs,
allows Commerce to administer the antidumping laws without undertaking an unau-
thorized countervailing duty investigation." Id.
88. Id. at 1429.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1430; see also Ehrenhaft, supra note 16, at 58-59.
91. 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
92. E. RosSIDES, supra note 19, at 253-54. The simple, traditional difference be-
tween antidumping law and countervailing duty law is best illustrated as follows:
Example 1: A German Sewing machine manufacturer, Singer, sells its
product in Germany for $100. It sells the same machine in the United States
for $75 (after adjustments for shipping, etc.). Singer receives no financial
assistance from the German government in connection with the production
or export of the machines. Only the antidumping law would apply since
there is no element of subsidy. Id. at 253.
Example 2: LaCarona, an Italian manufacturer, receives a government
subsidy payment equivalent to $5 for each typewriter it exports. This en-
ables it to sell its typewriters for $92.50 or the equivalent in both Italy and
the United States. Were it not for the subsidy, the price would be $95 in
both places. In this case, only the countervailing duty law would apply be-
cause, although there is subsidy, there is no price discrimination. Id. at 253.
Example 3: The Netherlands pays exporters of processed cheese an ex-
port subsidy of 2 cents per pound. Prochesse, a Dutch company, sells
processed cheese for 37 cents a pound in the Netherlands and 35 cents (af-
ter adjustments) to the United States. A complaint could be filed with the
Commerce Department asking for relief under either or both of these laws.
because elements of both price discrimination and subsidy exist in this case.
The added duty would, on the facts given, be the same under either law.
Id. at 254.
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2. The Concern that Subsidy Inclusion Denies Exporters a
Full Hearing on Whether the Benefit is a Subsidy
The CIT also rationalized that subsidy inclusion in con-
structed value would allow the ITA to counteract subsidization
without undertaking any of the procedural protections con-
tained in the countervailing duty statute.9" The CIT explained
that exporters should not be deprived of the opportunity to
have a full hearing at the agency level concerning whether the
benefits are subsidies as defined in Title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930.94 This apprehension is overstated because, as demon-
strated in Al Tech Specialty, exporters may demonstrate to the
ITA that the subsidy does not benefit production, and thus
should not be included in constructed value.9 '
3. Uncertainty Among Exporters
The CIT also based subsidy exclusion on its concern for
certainty in the administration of the United States trade
laws.96 The CIT explained :that subsidy inclusion in con-
structed value would result in substantial uncertainty among
exporters because benefits not previously countervailable
93. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1430 (citing Huffy Corp. v. United States,
632 F. Supp. 50, 55-56 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)).
94. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("TAN'), which added a new Title VII
to the Tariff Act of 1930, defines "subsidy" as a "bounty or grant" as that term is
used in section 303 of this Act [19 U.S.C. § 1303], and includes, but is not limited to,
the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the [GATT] ....
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by govern-
ment action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or be-
stowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of
any class of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms incon-
sistent with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, produc-
tion, or distribution.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
95. 49 Fed. Reg. 2995, 2996 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984). During the dumping
proceeding, the defendant in Al Tech Specialty argued that the government subsidies it
did receive were used to restructure facilities from which its tool steel operations did
not benefit. Id.
96. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
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could be attacked.97 While the uncertainty argument has some
merit in a case involving countervailable subsidies, it is much
less convincing when non-countervailable subsidies benefit
production since the existence of such subsidies in a con-
structed value case would be rare indeed.98
III. A PROPOSED ADDITION OF NON-
COUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDIES TO
CONSTRUCTED VALUE
Non-countervailable subsidies that benefit production
should be added to constructed value to accurately measure
the dumping margin.99 One example of a subsidy that is not
countervailable is one that is generally available." 0
A. The Generally Available Rule
The generally available rule resulted from the ITA's inter-
pretation that the countervailing duty law, which defines a sub-
sidy as a bounty or grant,' 0 ' requires that the purported sub-
sidy provide a benefit to a specific enterprise or industry, or
97. Id.
98. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 109-134 and accompanying text. The example of "assists" in
customs valuation may lend some support to the argument for subsidy inclusion in
constructed value. In customs valuation, assists are added to constructed value. See
Lionel Trading Co. v. United States, 24 C.C.P.A. 432 (1937); Troy Textiles v. United
States, 64 Cust. Ct. 654 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 29 Cust. Ct. 553
(1952); Ravenna Mosaics Inc. v. United States, 49 Treas. Dec. 699 (1926). There is
no definition of "assists" in the statutes or regulations, but they generally constitute
anything of value furnished to a manufacturer, free of charge or at less than full
value, which is necessary for the production of the particular imported good. R.
STURM, supra note 72, § 43.2, at 12.
The use of "assists" as an example of how constructed value could be inter-
preted in antidumping law is persuasive only to the extent that the policies for sub-
sidy inclusion in customs valuation are consistent with the policies of the antidump-
ing law. See Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986). The ITA often has refused to follow customs valuation precedents
where to do so would impede the specific policies of the antidumping law. See Televi-
sion Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, From Japan: Final Results of Adminis-
trative Review of Antidumping Finding, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,163 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1981) (ITA stated that judicial precedent interpreting the phrase "freely offered" in
the customs valuation context is irrelevant to interpreting the antidumping law).
100. See Bello, supra note 58, at 312-14; Powell & Concannon, Stare Decisis in the
Court of International Trade: One Court or Many?, in U.S. TRADE LAW AND POLICY 375-85
(1987).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982); see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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group of enterprises or industries.1 2 Under this requirement,
a nation-wide domestic subsidy, such as a two-hundred-per-
cent tax deduction for employee training, would not be subject
to countervailing duties. 0 3 More recently, the ITA has refused
to countervail several subsidies because their benefits were not
limited to a specific group of enterprises or industries. 04 Such
non-countervailable benefits include: a government funded
fisheries management program, the results of which were pub-
lished and generally accessible; government grants and loan
insurance that were not limited to a specific industry or enter-
prise; programs that cover half the cost of attending important
102. See E. McGOVERN, supra note 25, § 12.113. The statute's reference to "spe-
cific" enterprises or industries has been taken by the ITA to mean that generally
available assistance is excluded from the scope of the countervailing duty law. Id. at
351. The ITA has held to this view even when the number of domestic firms which
could make use of the particular advantage was very small. Id.; see S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 381, 470.
The definition of "subsidy" is intended to clarify that the term has the same meaning
which administrative practice and the courts have ascribed to the term "bounty or
grant" under section 303 and the Tariff Act of 1930, unless that practice or interpre-
tation is inconsistent with the bill. Id.
Several examples of non-countervailable production benefits exist. See, e.g., Un-
processed Float Glass from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,097 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984)
(aid to firms with foreign indebtedness are not subsidies); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers
from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 15,007 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984) (loans for agricultural
production are not subsidies); Pork Rind Pellets from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,105
(Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (loans to all small and medium-sized firms are not subsi-
dies, but preferential loans to priority-status medium-sized firms are countervailable
subsidies); Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (Int'l
Trade Admin. 1983) (low-priced natural gas available to all industries is not a sub-
sidy); Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,105 (Int'l Trade Ad-
min. 1983) (standing timber generally available to industry is not a subsidy); Indus-
trial Nitrocellulose from France, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,971, 25,254 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1983) (aid to firms employing young people is not a subsidy); Fresh Asparagus from
Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,618 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (waler for farmers is not a
subsidy); Certain Steel Products from Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (funding for a relatively small group of high-technology industries is
not a subsidy); Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332 (Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (aid towards pensions in extractive industries are not a subsidy). See
generally E. MCGOVERN, supra note 10, at 351.
103. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 339, 590 F.
Supp. 1237 (1984). According to this court, "[t]ax laws become bounties or grants to
the taxpayer only if the elimination, or reduction of the tax is selective." Id. at 349.
104. Certain Refrigeration Compressors from the Republic of Singapore; Final
Results of Administrative Review of Suspension Agreement, 50 Fed. Reg. 30,493
(Int'l Trade Admin. 1985) [hereinafter Refrigeration Compressors from the Republic
of Singapore]. See Bello, supra note 58, at 312-14; Powell & Concannon, supra note
100, at 375-85.
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trade shows in cases where the firm can demonstrate that it will
be in a position to pursue business orders received at such
shows; and a program offering up to a $50,000 grant for manu-
facturers to develop new market opportunities and new prod-
ucts in Newfoundland, Canada. 0
5
While the generally available rule first emerged as a broad
limitation on countervailing subsidies, it has been a point of
contention between the CIT and the ITA.'0 6 In apparently
contradictory opinions, the CIT first severely limited, and then
later broadened the scope of the generally available rule. 0 7
Nonetheless, this rule remains an exception to countervailable
subsidies. 0 8
B. An Argument for the Inclusion of Non-countervailable Subsidies
That Benefit Production in Constructed Value
In the case of non-countervailable subsidies which benefit
105. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Live Swine and
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097, 25,107-
09 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1985).
106. For example in Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l
Trade 229, 564 F. Supp. 834 (1983), the court found two accelerated depreciation
programs generally available, thus not countervailable. Id. at 836. Both programs
allowed corporations to take an additional twenty percent depreciation beyond that
normally taken. The requirements for taking advantage of one of these benefits was
that the factory or machinery in question was in operation at least twelve hours daily.
Id. The second benefit applied to all corporations with a history of keeping accurate
records, including tax returns. In Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 339, 590 F.
Supp. 1237 (1984), the CIT limited the generally available rule to tax laws and criti-
cized the broader rule it established in Carlisle Tire & Rubber, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade at 349-
50, 590 F. Supp. at 1246. See Powell & Concannon, supra note 100, at 375-85. None-
theless, the ITA in Refrigeration Compressors from the Republic of Singapore, supra
note 104, at 30,494 wrote: "We do not consider generally available programs to be
countervailable. The petitioner's reliance on Bethlehem Steel is misplaced since the
court in that case upheld our determination that a generally available tax benefit is
not countervailable. The court's further comments in Bethlehem Steel on general avail-
ability are dicta." Id.
107. Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 339, 590
F. Supp. 1237 (1984) with Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985) and Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 229,
564 F. Supp. 834 (1983). See generally Bello, supra note 58, at 312-14; Powell & Con-
cannon, supra note 100, at 375-85.
108. See E. McGOVERN, supra note 25, § 12.113; Bello, supra note 58, at 312-14;
Bello & Homer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Reects a Lateral Attack on the
Specificity Test, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297 (1984):Jameson. The Administra-
twn of the United States Countenvailing Duty Laws with Regard to Domestic Subsidies: Where
It's Been, Where It Is and Where It May Go, 12 SYRACUSEJ. lr'L L. & CoM. 15, 78-86
(198 5 ).
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production the inclusion of subsidies would not conflict with
precedent. Moreover, the original purpose of constructed
value-the accurate measurement of foreign market value-is
furthered by the addition of subsidies that are not countervail-
able, but that still benefit production. 0 9
Since the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
("TAA"),110 countervailing duty and antidumping laws have
been administered by the same agencies under similar proce-
dures." Dumping margin and subsidy determinations are
both made by the ITA, and the injury determinations under
both statutes are made by the International Trade Commission
(,,ITC,").I"2 Therefore, the administrative details of providing
adequate process for subsidized defendants in an antidumping
proceeding should not be as onerous as the CIT suggests." 3
109. The purpose of antidumping law is to counteract discriminatory pricing
between national markets that allows foreign producers to sell below cost in the
United States. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923); see
Applebaum, The Antidumping Laws-Impact on the Competitive Process, 43 ANTITRUST L.J.
590, 591-93 (1974); see also Applebaum, Foreign Predation and Price Discrimination Against
U.S. Firms-Antidumping Under Title. VII, in 1984 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTrTUTE
I (B. Hawk ed. 1985). The cost of production section, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), of the Trade Act of 1974 emphasizes the importance of accurately
detecting and measuring dumping:
The purpose of the amendment is to prevent foreign sales below cost of
production being used as the basis for determining whether sales of such
merchandise to the United States are at less than the foreign market value.
Otherwise, sales below cost to purchasers in the United States could be ex-
empted from the provisions of the Act if sales prices in the home market or
to third countries are also below cost by an equal or greater amount.
The Trade Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 10710, Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1974).
According to the Report of the Senate Finance Committee, "[tihe Committee is
concerned that, in the absence of such a provision, sales uniformly made at less than
cost of production could escape the purview of the Act, and thereby cause injury to
United States industry with impunity." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 173,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7310.
110. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). See generally Barcelo, Subsidies, Coun-
tervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 285
(1980).
11. See generally Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Investi-
gations Under the TradeAgreements Act of 1979, 14J. INT'L L. &ECON. 1 (1980); Note, The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Duty Procedures, 14 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 63 (1980).
112. H. KAYE, P. PLAIA & M. HERTZBERG, supra note 26, § 18.03.
113. Cohen, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Executive Agreements, Subsidies, and
Countervailing Duties, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 96, 109 (1980). The procedure for imposition
of dumping duties closely resembles that for countervailing duties. The dumping
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Furthermore, concurrent consideration of subsidy and dump-
ing issues might expedite proceedings where the foreign pro-
ducer arguably has benefitted from subsidies that may be
found generally available. Although concurrent consideration
of subsidy and dumping data would complicate the ITA's ad-
ministrative responsibilities, a plaintiff may clearly petition the
ITA under both the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
where dumping and subsidization exist. The administrative
burden of considering alleged subsidies in the context of the
antidumping law could be minimized if limited to actions
where the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that a sub-
sidy exists. If the ITA then determines that a subsidy that ben-
efits production exists but is generally available, it should be
free to include the subsidy in constructed value to the extent it
benefits production.
The Al Tech Specialty court based its holding on the fact
that the subsidies in question would be better counteracted
with the countervailing duty law. 1 4 In the case of a generally
available subsidy that cannot be countervailed, the Al Tech Spe-
cialty court's most compelling rationale-that the subsidy may
be countervailed-would not exist. Furthermore, the CIT's
other policy concerns fail to compel the Al Tech Specialty hold-
ing in the context of non-countervailable subsidies.
1. Subsidy Inclusion in Constructed Value and the Proper
Scope of U.S. Antidumping Law
The CIT's first policy consideration, the scope of the an-
tidumping law, militated against blurring the distinction be-
tween antidumping and countervailing duty law. However, the
purpose of both laws is to eliminate the advantage of an im-
porter that can unfairly underprice domestic competition.
investigation begins in the same manner as under the countervailing duty law, and
the threshold determinations under both laws are very similar. Id. at 109. Since an-
tidumping and countervailing duty determinations are roughly similar in procedure,
the administrative burden of occasionally considering non-countervailable subsidies
in antidumping determinations would not be prohibitively burdensome and would be
within the ITA's authority. See generally G. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 7. Because of the
vagueness of the statutory definitions and the generality of those regulations that
have been issued, agency discretion has been widely exercised in interpreting this
statute. Id.
114. See Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. %,. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421, 1430
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
1987] 227
228 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:208
While each law counteracts a different unfair activity--i.e.,
price discrimination and subsidization-both exist to protect
domestic producers from the unfairly low pricing practices of
foreign exporters. 1 15
If a non-countervailable subsidy benefits production and
the foreign market value is constructed, then the subsidy
should be added to constructed value in order to accurately
reflect the producer's variable and fixed production costs."16 If
the subsidy in question is not countervailable, there is no blur-
ring or commingling of the laws, as the countervailing duty law
does not come into play. Subsidy inclusion is essential for the
accuracy of the constructed value calculation. Such inclusion
results in a more accurate foreign market value, as measured
by constructed value, and ensures that the dumping duty will
more accurately approximate the true degree of disparate pric-
ing.' 17 Moreover, if the subsidy benefits production, but is not
countervailable, its inclusion in constructed value is consistent
with the purpose of accurately measuring discriminatory pric-
ing between national markets." "I
2. Subsidy Inclusion in Constructed Value and the
Defendant's Right to Process
The Al Tech Specialty court's concern that subsidy inclusion
would allow the ITA to counteract subsidization without a de-
termination of whether a subsidy exists, as defined in Title
VII,' 9 also would not apply to non-countervailable subsi-
dies. 20 In a determination of whether certain subsidies should
be considered within constructed value, the relevant issue is
the extent to which these subsidies diminished the foreign
manufacturer's production costs, i.e., the extent to which they
benefitted production.' 2' Furthermore, whether the subsidy
115. Id. at 1429-30.
116. G. BRYAN, supra note 18, at 15-16.
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
119. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982).
120. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
121. See 50 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1982). The Al Tech Specialty
plaintiffs argued before the ITA that all manufacturing costs should be considered
regardless of who bears the cost, since the subsidies merely shift costs from the pro-
ducer to the government. Id. This interpretation of cost is consistent with the pur-
pose of the constructed value and cost of production sections, which was to more
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falls within the definition of bounty or grant is relevant only to
determining whether it is countervailable, not whether it bene-
fits production.' 22 Generally available subsidies clearly are not
countervailable,123 thus, whether such a subsidy falls within the
statutory definition of subsidy is irrelevant. Accordingly, gen-
erally available subsidies are not subsidies under the Title VII
definition.' 24  Additionally, the non-countervailable subsidy
situation suggests only a narrow application of subsidies to
constructed value. ' 2
5
In the context of non-countervailable subsidies that bene-
fit production, the concern that subsidy inclusion would deny
exporters a full hearing on whether a countervailable subsidy
exists is not germane. The appropriate issue in such a con-
structed value calculation is whether the generally available
subsidy benefits production, and, if so, the extent of such ben-
efit.' 26 As demonstrated by the Al Tech Specialty defendant, de-
fendants in dumping actions have the opportunity to contend
that any alleged subsidies they may have received did not ben-
efit production, and, therefore, could not be considered in a
constructed value calculation.1
2 7
accurately approximate foreign market value. See supra note 109 and accompanying
text. According to the Senate Report that accompanied the Antidumping Act of
1921, the purpose of the old cost of production section, which is now the constructed
value section, was
to create a constructive foreign market value based on the cost of material
and labor at a time preceding the date of shipment of the imported mer-
chandise which would ordinarily permit the manufacture or production of
such merchandise in the usual course of business. It is not limited to the actual
cost of the imported merchandise.
S. REP. No. 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1921) (emphasis added).
122. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
127. 49 Fed. Reg. 2995, 2996 (Int'l Trade Admin. 1984). InAI Tech Specialty, the
defendant West German producer argued before the ITA that the benefits received
did not accrue to the production of the tool steel under investigation. Id. In refer-
ence to non-countervailable subsidies under consideration in an antidumping investi-
gation, the relevant defense is that the subsidies in question did not benefit the pro-
duction of the merchandise in question. Id. Since the Al Tech Specialty defendant
made this argument to the ITA, this case demonstrates that the defendant has the
opportunity to assert the most relevant defense to subsidy inclusion in constructed
value. Id. In an antidumping proceeding, the defendant has adequate process to
argue that the non-countervailable subsidies at issue did not benefit the production
of the goods under investigation.
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3. Subsidy Inclusion and Uncertainty Among Exporters
The CIT's final policy concern was that subsidy inclusion
would create uncertainty among exporters because benefits
not previously countervailable could be counteracted. 28 This
concern overstates the reality of including generally available
subsidies in constructed value because this suggested inclusion
would be rare. Indeed, the inclusion of subsidies is suggested
only when the following four conditions concurrently exist:
1) the subsidy in question is not countervailable; 2) the subsidy
significantly benefits production; 3) the ITA employs con-
structed value to represent foreign market value; and 4) the
dumping in question is deleterious enough to materially injure
or tend to materially injure domestic industry.'2 9 By focusing
on uncertainty among exporters, the CIT has not considered
the importance of accurately measuring foreign market value.
If non-countervailable benefits subsidize production, then fail-
ure to consider them in constructed value represents a system-
atic flaw in the comparison of foreign market value and United
States price. 3 0
In an earlier CIT case, Connors Steel Co. v. United States,''
the court decided that the existence of, or suspicion that, a
subsidy benefits production should not affect the determina-
tion of whether the ITA investigates the prospect of home
market dumping. ' 3 2 Therefore, the ITA will not employ a con-
structed value as a result of home market dumping unless suffi-
cient additional evidence, other than the presence of a subsidy,
128. Al Tech Specialty, 651 F. Supp. at 1430.
129. This Comment has not discussed the material injury requirement in detail,
as this is not germane to the issue of statutory construction and the occasional inclu-
sion of some subsidies in constructed value. Nonetheless, dumping is not actionable
unless it either materially retards the establishment of an industry in the United
States, or has materially injured or threatened material injury to an established do-
mestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982 & III Supp. 1985).
130. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
131. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 242, 527 F. Supp. 350 (1981), tems of remand modified, 3 Ct.
Int'l Trade 79, 566 F. Supp. 1521 (1982).
132. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 250, 527 F. Supp. at 358. If foreign market value is
constructed because actual sales were disregarded pursuant to the cost of production
section, see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982), evidence other than the subsidy of home
market dumping should exist. Therefore, in constructed value determinations which
result from a finding of sales at less than cost of production, there must exist addi-
tional evidence of below-cost home market sales apart from subsidies. Connors Steel, 2
Ct. Int'l Trade at 249-50, 527 F. Supp. at 358.
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warrants an investigation of whether the home market price is
less than fair market value.133
The suggested inclusion of subsidies in constructed value
is so narrow as to provide uncertainty among but a few foreign
exporters, many of whom have benefitted from foreign subsi-
dies and then dumped their products in the United States.
Furthermore, the decision to investigate the existence of home
market dumping is independent of subsidies. m3 4 Thus, if the
ITA constructs foreign market value as a result of home market
dumping, evidence of dumping must exist apart from the exist-
ence of subsidization. In the few cases embraced by this sug-
gested inclusion of subsidies, the policy of accurately measur-
ing the extent of dumping and remedying its unfair advantage
outweighs any concern for uncertainty among a few exporters.
CONCLUSION
The Court of International Trade in Al Tech Specialty re-
cently established a rule of excluding subsidies from con-
structed value, but it has yet to consider this issue in the con-
text of non-countervailable subsidies. The determinative fac-
tors for subsidy exclusion were policy concerns, not judicial
precedent, legislative history, or long-standing administrative
practice. Where subsidies are generally available, however,
economic policy and the need to accurately measure the dump-
ing margin suggest that subsidies should be added to con-
structed value to the extent they benefit production. Thus, the
CIT's refusal to add subsidies to constructed value should be
limited to countervailable subsidies. The inclusion of non-
countervailable subsidies to the extent they benefit production
would not be inconsistent with precedent and legislative his-
tory, and would promote fair trade through the effective en-
forcement of U.S. antidumping law.
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133. Connors Steel, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade at 250, 527 F. Supp. at 358.
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